MERLEAU-PONTY FROM PERCEPTION TO LANGUAGE. NEW ELEMENTS OF INTERPRETATION by Dreon, Roberta
48 Roberta Dreon
Roberta Dreon(Università Ca’ Foscari - Venezia)
MERLEAU-PONTY
FROM PERCEPTION TO LANGUAGE.
NEW ELEMENTS OF INTERPRETATION
Maurice Merleau-Ponty is widely known for his work on perce-ption, but his research in the field of language is extremely richand wide-ranging: it extends from the acquisition of language byinfants to the various pathologies connected to the decline of hu-man verbal capacities, from writing to cases of artistic efforts tofind a new language capable of expressing new experiences of theworld. If wish to set out in search of a philosophy of language inMerleau-Ponty’s work, we must bear in mind what he statedabout hermeneutics, namely that a theory about language cannotbe without facts1.In recent times important integrations to Merleau-Ponty’scorpus have been made through the publication of the previouslyunreleased sources from the National Library in Paris. While hi-therto Merleau-Ponty’s lessons at the France College in the fiftieswere only known through the summaries published in the AnnualReport of that institution, we can now read the notes for two of hiscourses dating back to 1952-53, Le monde sensible et le monde de
l'expression and Recherches sur l'usage littéraire du langage (Mer-leau-Ponty 2011 and Merleau-Ponty 2013). These basically con-firm the great attention which Merleau-Ponty devoted to languagein those years, and which led him to develop his inquiries into thefield of perception in a different direction. The picture will becomecomplete with the publication of the notes of a third course, Le
problème de la parole, which was held the following year, and forwhich we have still to rely on the Résumés (Merleau-Ponty 1968)– but this paper will also refer to an indirect source, Stefan Kri-
1 See Merleau-Ponty 2011, 47: «Une herméneutique de la facticité ne peut être sans faits».Merleau-Ponty was here clearly referring to Heidegger's philosophy and its peculiarconfiguration.
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stensen’s reconstruction of these lessons in his Parole et subjecti-
vité (Kristensen 2010).In the past, Merleau-Ponty’s research on language was wide-ly known through a good range of sources. Claude Lefort editedand published La prose du monde (Merleau-Ponty 1969) after thephilosopher's premature death. This is the provisional draft of abook on which the phenomenologist worked in the early fifties,without ever coming up with a definitive version that satisfiedhim2. The third chapter of the book was partially rewritten andpublished in the journal Les temps moderne by the author himselfin the form of an essay entitled Le langage indirect et le voix du si-
lence (Merleau-Ponty 1960). In Signes we also find Sur la phéno-
ménologie du langage (Merleau-Ponty 1960), the text of a talk heldby Merleau-Ponty in 1951. Going back a couple years more, wemust recall the course La conscience et l’acquisition du langage,held by the philosopher when he was teaching infant psychologyand pedagogy at the Sorbonne in 1949 (Merleau-Ponty 2001).The two recently published series of lecture notes effectivelyprovide new elements for understanding how the issue of lan-guage played a crucial role in helping Merleau-Ponty to configurethe new concepts of subject and consciousness, which sprungfrom La phénoménologie de la perception (Merleau-Ponty 1945)and deeply contributed to the author’s reshaping of the third partof this book and his reformulation of the metaphysical side of hisinquiries in the form of the so-called ontology of the flesh3.However, the focus of this paper will be on the connectionsbetween perception and language, for which new important in-sights can be gained from the notes4.In the Thursday course the concept of expression firstlyfinds an explicit and articulated formulation, crucially contribut-ing to explain the continuity between perception and language. Al-though basically continuing to follow the main phenomenologicalstream by searching for the roots of linguistic meanings in percep-tions (Kristensen 2010, 107), the attribution of an expressive cha-racter to perceptions themselves makes it clear that for Merleau-Ponty perceptive experience is not to be understood as the direct
2 On some problems about the published version of La prose du monde that emergewhen considering the philosopher's unpublished notes, see Noble 2014, 201.3 On this transition, see Saint Aubert 2011.4 My aim here is to update and further develop the inquiries I proposed in Dreon 2007,Chapters II and III.
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intuition and giveness of something immediately present. A conti-nuity exists between perception and linguistic acts of parole, andthe two share a structure analogous to the one characterizing lin-guistic meanings. The self-moving body is conceived as the crucialaspect of the expressive attitude at the core of both perceptionand speech. But can movement – movement from within theworld we belong to – be a sufficient condition for explaining thisdistinctively human characteristic?In the Monday course the idea of the two languages findssupport and is developed in a more radical direction through Mer-leau-Ponty’s confrontation with the experience of the writer try-ing to find new words to convey his experience of the word. But isthis emphasis on the langage conquérant at the expenses of ordi-nary shared linguistic practices unproblematic and can it really beendorsed?The present paper will try to reconstruct these elements e-merging from the new resources at our disposal, while consider-ing both the positive contributions and the problematic implica-tions they can provide with regard to the relations between per-ception and language.
1. Expressive perceptionsIt can be acknowledged that, when it comes to the topic we areconsidering here Merleau-Ponty’s basic philosophical move re-mains the same throughout his work, from La structure du com-
portement to Le visible et l'invisible. It consists in an attempt totrace linguistic meanings and logical categories back to their al-leged roots in the pre-reflexive layer of perceptive experience.From this point of view, the French philosopher extends and fur-ther develops the phenomenological tradition originating withHusserl, and particularly works such as Erfahrung und Urteil(Husserl 1999) and Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und
die transzendentale Phänomenologie (Husserl 1959).However, while the primacy of perception remains the mile-stone of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, in the fifties his atten-tion is no longer focused on the alleged derivation of languagefrom perception, but on the structures they share and on the pe-culiarities of linguistic expression in comparison to the larger fieldof perceptive expression – leading him to support the idea of a«dialectic of expression». So while linguistic meanings in Merleau-Ponty’s view are essentially based on – and develop – our percep-
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tive experience, language produces and implies an essential re-structuring of our experience of the world (Kristensen 2010, 73)5.Linguistic sense emerges from perceptive sense, but the former isnot reducible to the latter. In my previous work on this subject Imade the point that Merleau-Ponty never completes this move byexplicitly admitting a retro-action of language on human percep-tive experience – so that if we consider our distinctively humanforms of life, the whole notion of a purely perceptive level of expe-rience is bound to appear as an abstraction (Dreon 2007, 163).Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that the concept ofexpression presented in the lessons on the sensible world held in1953 provides a crucial element for articulating the idea of a basicstructural continuity between perception and language.Hence, let us begin by quoting the passage from the first les-son where Merleau-Ponty outlines his notion of expression:On entendra ici par expression ou expressivité la propriété qu'aun phénomène, par son agencement interne, d'en faire connaîtreun autre qui n'est pas ou même qui n'a jamais été donné. L'outil,l'ouvrage, exprime l'homme en ce sens. L'ouvrage de l'esprit ou letableau aussi, mais plus complexe: ils expriment l'homme en par-lant des choses ou du monde aussi bien, de sort qu'ici il y a nonseulement homme qui s'exprime dans produit mais par ailleursproduit qui exprime le monde, l'homme s'attestant par l'appari-tion de ce rapport (Merleau-Ponty 2011, 48).In order to understand what the philosopher means when hespeaks about expression and  presents perception itself as some-thing expressive, we should move away both from the common-sense idea of expression and from a certain philosophical assum-ption that perception is the way things are not only originally gi-ven to us, but also clearly and immediately given to us.From Merleau-Ponty’s perspective, expression is not the out-side transmission of a pre-existing meaning – for example thecommunication to other people of an allegedly private state ofmind, which ought to be already completely determined before itis conveyed. Expression is rather that peculiar property characte-rizing objects, human artefacts, utensils and works of art (and itwould be helpful if Merleau-Ponty had also spoken about practic-es or behaviors as expressive) as implying something other thanthemselves as given in presence, that is something that is not giv-
5 This point was already noted in the past by Yves Thierry (Thierry 1987, 7).
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en in presence or which remains opaque, implicit and not visible,by contrast to the object which is given. Something is expressivebecause it belongs to a human world – that is, it can be expressiveonly from an anthropological point of view – and moreover it isexpressive in the sense that it makes us glimpse, half-see or im-agine something else which is not given in its full presence and de-terminacy. This 'further' thing is nothing mysterious or esoteric: itmay be the background of a figure standing on the foreground, the
écart in comparison to a more primitive level, a certain practicefrom which a specific thing derives its own significance, or awhole form of life in reference to which something finds its properfunction or meaning.On the other hand, perception is always understood by Mer-leau-Ponty as the primary source of sense, but this does not implythat perceptive experience supplies an immediately clear and di-stinct picture of what exists. When we perceive something as de-termined, we always perceive a more nuanced something elsealongside it that is not given in presence, but which constitutesthe necessary background or the ground level in reference towhich we can perceive a certain object, that is our focus – a figurein the background or a difference in comparison to a specific levelrepresenting the norm for us in a particular context.It may be noted that in Merleau-Ponty’s notions of expres-sion and perception as something expressive many influences areat work. First of all we can detect an appropriation of the Gestalt-
psychologie idea of the necessary correlation between figure andbackground, object and perceptive field: perception, including vi-sual perception, does not primarily give us access to mere isolatedobjects, whose boundaries are conceived as being completely andautonomously defined. On the contrary, it has to do with selectiveand dynamic structures that always imply a certain degree of opa-city or indeterminacy as the correlative condition for clarity anddeterminacy. Secondly, we can perceive the influence of the struc-turalist assumption that no sign has its own significance autono-mously or per se. On the contrary, sense – both on the perceptiveand on the linguistic level – is conceived as a diacritic phenome-non, that is as something emerging from the mutual differentia-tion of signs. Perception itself has to do with a sort of interplayamong different moving features, which are not definitely givenand can be fixed only provisionally and in certain situations. Fre-quently as I will later point out, ordinary and scientific language
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tend to artificially stiffen these reciprocal differentiations amongmeanings by interpreting the connection between a single signand its correlative reference as something given once and forever.From a structuralist perspective, these circumstances tend to ma-ke us consider the system of signs – la langue – as preeminent andpre-established in comparison to any further contingent act of pa-
role6. Furthermore, I would add that the concept of expression de-veloped here by Merleau-Ponty is resonant with Heidegger's ana-lysis of the so called «hermeneutisches als», which emphasizes thatsomething – a utensil, in Heidegger’s case too – can be perceivedand understood as what it is only by reference to certain humanpractices and to an articulated web of references which are notthematic, but constitute the necessary pre-assumptions – the Vor-
habe, Vorsicht and Vorgriff – for grasping something as that parti-cular thing and not a different one (Heidegger 1927, § 32). More-over, in the French philosopher's definition of expression as some-thing implying a reference to men and to a whole human world wecan detect an echo of Heidegger’s interpretation of the world asthe ultimate system of cross-references, which is virtually in-volved in the fact of experiencing something as something – a sys-tem whose ultimate reference is human existence. For this reason,I agree with Stefan Kristensen when he states that «l'analyse de la
perception devient herméneutique sans que cela n'implique la ré-
duction du contenu perceptif à un contenu linguistique» (Kristen-sen 2010, 78).To sum up, perception, still maintains its primacy in Mer-leau-Ponty’s thought. However, his characterization of perceptionas expression makes it clear that he rejected the so-called Carte-sian form of intuitionism, that is the idea of perception as the di-rect grasping of what there is, basically coinciding with a dyadicrelation between a knowing subject and a perceived object. In hisview, perceptions always imply a third, more indeterminate butnecessary element: a more or less nuanced field of perception, animplicitly assumed system of reciprocal differentiation betweensenses, a reference to a human practice and action. But his originalpoint here is that this reference to a third aspect is realized by
6 On the contrary, Merleau-Ponty interpreted Saussure's inquiries as having finally es-tablished the primacy of the so-called parole over langue, which should be considered asan abstraction or as a momentary picture of linguistic utterances. On Merleau-Ponty'spartial stretching of Saussure's position, see Roux 2016.
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means not of a semiotic interpretation – an inference, in Peirce’sterms – but rather of a body, and more precisely a bodily schema7.
2. The mediating bodyFrom this point of view, the thesis that the body is the medium ofperception acquires a new light. In the following lessons it be-comes clear that the expressive root of perception is connected tothe moving body, which shares the same field as the perceived ob-ject and actively operates from within it. The body appears as thenatural subject (Lanfredini 2011, 73) of a praxis in an environ-ment with which it constantly coordinates its moves, by practical-ly taking into account what it meets, what can or cannot bereached, what remains opaque, nuanced or invisible simply be-cause we, as body, are heavy and limited in our movements, andnecessarily occupy a certain position in any given moment andcannot be ubiquitous. Hence, Merleau-Ponty says that the humanbody is expressive because in every human gesture it designs anddevelops an Umwelt8 – it never primarily perceives an object as anisolated entity in a vacuum, but perceives it by means of a practic-al triadic coordination with a certain environment constituting thethird reference involved, without any need for interpretation.Simply by occupying a certain position rather than any other oneat a certain moment and having to reach a different goal, the bodyconstitutes a normative level in comparison to which somethingelse is perceived as a variance, difference or deviation – écart inthe French version. Finally, in one of the last lessons the bodilyschema emerges as a dynamic system of coordination and selec-tive attuning to the surrounding world, which «indique l'essentiel,[…] domine les détails, […] dégage le sens, […] indique un ordre».All this happens as a sort of «aide-mémoire qui n'a même besoin
d'interpretation» (Merleau-Ponty 2011, 133) – the Phénoménolo-
gie de la perception employs the term «praktognosie». From thispoint of view, perception, understood as something expressive, isseen to lie at the basis of the expressive world, while the humanliving body is supposed to play the role of a basic medium origi-nally configuring our cultural or spiritual world from the inside.
7 I am here making an implicit reference to the critical analysis of Descart's form of intui-tionism suggested by Charles Sanders Peirce in his Questions Concerning Certain Facul-
ties Claimed for Man (Peirce 1868). On this delicate turning point see Paolucci 2016, 30and 34.8 I am reformulating here Merleau-Ponty 2011, 58.
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3. The peculiarities of languagesWhat about language? It has to be said that Merleau-Ponty’s ana-lysis in this course makes almost no reference to language and lin-guistic practices until the very last pages. Coherently with the tra-ditional phenomenological approach to perception and language,he warns us that «ceci nous amènerait au langage sans que nous y
entrions cette année» (Merleau-Ponty 2011, 53). Therefore, theidea that human perception can be investigated apart from lan-guage is taken for granted.Nonetheless, these lessons provide at least two important in-dications on this subject.The first one is clearly stated in the last lesson: if the mean-ing of a bodily gesture is strictly connected to the bodily move-ment, intended as a sign, language guarantees a «transcendance
radicale du signifié à l'égard du signifiant» (Ibidem, 162). While inperceptive expression the signified cannot be definitely separatedfrom the signifier, in the case of linguistic expressions we canclearly operate this distinction and act as through the reference toa certain object were direct and obvious. This is a very importantfeature of linguistic expression in comparison to perceptive ex-pression, which is constantly pointed out in Merleau-Ponty’sworks from the fifties: as verbal meanings can be separated fromlinguistic signs, language gives us the chance to sever the intimateconnection between a gesture and its own significance – a wink, anod or a grimace are inseparable from what they mean. On thecontrary, linguistic expressions can be relatively fixed: they areshared and subject to sedimentation. This kind of process can beso strong as to lead us to slip into the fallacious belief that the ref-erence to a specific thing by a certain word is given once and forall and is independent of any speech act – as if the system of the
langue should be a priori and autonomous in respect to any act of
parole.In this last lesson Merleau-Ponty notes that this is not the ca-se with dreams, where this kind of transcendence of meaningswith respect to significant gestures is lacking and the apparentlydirect symbolism of articulated language seems to be substitutedby a sort of gestural language, where the signified cannot be relea-sed from the signifier. In the following course the possibility of alanguage where connections between signs and meanings remainopen, unfixed and not taken for granted is investigated within thefield of literary language, by emphasizing the duality between a
56 Roberta Dreon
functional, ordinary language and the so-called «langage conqué-
rant» – which will be discussed later.A second element useful to articulate language peculiaritiescan be identified in Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to explain the pas-sage from the practical, concrete attitude to the categorial one –which will be further developed in the course on Le problème de la
parole, where his aim is to explain how the uttered word can bethe source of essence. The central point here is the passage fromthe gestural dimension of expression to the level of idealities.In the course on the expressive world we can already find animportant element connected to the notion of virtual space, whichis discussed in connection to pathological cases of apraxia. Virtualspace is not interpreted as a pre-given general category in whichwe should subsume each particular space; but nor is it understoodas the inductive result of the generalization of common propertiesshared by single cases. According to Merleau-Ponty, activities suchas pointing at and showing something implicitly involve a refe-rence to a virtual space which is the result of a system of corre-spondences and mutual differentiations between one actual spaceand the space of other situations (both in the past and in the fu-ture). This is a first element that reveals the genesis of an eideticreference in expressive contexts according to the French philo-sopher (Ibidem, 65). Hence, the emergence of a categorial attitudeseems to be linked to processes of reciprocal differentiationacross diverse contexts and of mutual differentiation of the rela-tions between figure and background – neither inductive genera-lization nor the subsuming of particular cases into an alleged in-tuitively given category is the key element.However, as Kristensen has noted, the point is more widelyexplored in the following course on Le problème de la parole. HereMerleau-Ponty criticizes the common idea according to whichconcepts should be considered logical intuitions that can be ap-plied to single, unique things by means of linguistic predications,in reference to which concepts would be independently and pre-viously given. From this point of view, the categorial attitudeshould be «la cause de l'articulation linguistique» (Kristensen2010, 138), whereas Merleau-Ponty maintains that it is the out-growth of speech acts and that the place of words is betweenthings and concepts. Hence, linguistic meanings are neither per-ceptive nor conceptual, but function as the processes generatingconceptual meanings from the perceptive field. More precisely,
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according to Merleau-Ponty language accomplishes the passagefrom an affective level of meaning to a properly linguistic mean-ing: while in the first case each gesture is intimately linked towhat it means and its significance cannot be separated from theoccurrence of the gesture itself, on the linguistic level meaningsare still open and can change, but are not arbitrary, as they musttake into account the complex web of reciprocal differentiationsshared by an intersubjective community9. Eidetic features cannotderive from the identification of invariant elements. Otherwise,essences would emerge as the result of these open processes ofdifferentiation, as selected figures brought into the foregroundwith respect to a dynamic and unclosed reciprocal configurationof signs, when the context is considered in the widest possiblesense as the whole configuration itself10. Language can transcenda particular context or a regional field and consider our expe-rience by differentiating it from the perspective of a more inclu-sive background. Essences are figures coming into the foregroundwhen the field is envisaged as the whole system of mutual linguis-tic differentiations.L'attitude catégoriale ne se distingue donc de l'attitude concrèteque par le changement d'échelle qu'elle entraîne. Les catégoriessont simplement des figures apparaissant sur le fond du mondelui-même tandis que le perçu apparaît dans des champs locaux.C'est ce geste de nouvelle contextualisation qui à proprement par-ler produit l'idéalité (Ibidem, 155).But this means that the contours of concepts are never definitelydetermined because they depend on the reciprocal and dynamicinterplay between a figure and an always relatively changingbackground. Language is never static and the temporary picture itdraws always depends on the dynamic movements taking placeamong its components.
4. A few doubtsLet us briefly return to Merleau-Ponty’s characterization of per-ception as something expressive. As has already been argued, hewas able to develop a sort of hermeneutic or – if we like – semiotic
9 This is the reason why Maurice Merleau-Ponty understands connections between signsand meanings as something conventional yet not arbitrary.10 To reconstruct the content of the still unpublished notes of this course I am relying onKristensen 2010, 125 ff.
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conception of perception, in the sense that perception in his viewinvolves a kind of silent semiosis which takes place through mov-ing body rather than through interpretation or intellectual infe-rence. The lessons on Le monde sensible et le monde de l’expressionclearly presents this view, which can partially be glimpsed in oth-er works roughly belonging to the same period, where it is not ar-ticulated in the same detailed way.This is no doubt a brilliant, insightful thesis that must betaken into serious account. What also makes it extremely inte-resting in my opinion is the fact that it allows us to distinguish be-tween two meanings of perception as a direct or immediate phe-nomenon. We can consider perceptive experience as the directgrasping of what is out there, as the mere reception of neutral da-ta with no meaning in themselves. Alternatively, we can under-stand perception as something direct or immediate in the sensethat it is very often irreflexive and based on a kind of practical bo-dily knowledge and provides immediately perceived meanings orrelations – and, of course, this latter option becomes acceptablestarting from a perspective like the one developed by Merleau-Ponty11.However, I have some doubts about the idea that such an ex-pressive form of perception could be possible without the emer-gence of language in the human world. In other words, I am reluc-tant to endorse the assumption that bodily mediation could besufficient to explain such a complex form of perception in humans.Here I am neither supporting a return to the old-fashioned ap-proach to language as the transcendental condition of possibilityfor human experience nor upholding a form of linguistic reductio-nism. I am rather considering the hypothesis that the emergenceof language, with its strong relational structure, could have actedupon perception itself by configuring it as the distinctively humanform of perception that Maurice Merleau-Ponty helps us to under-stand – that is, as an already meaningful, expressive experience,implying references to a Lebenswelt or a form of life, to put it sim-ply. Unless we accept the direct reference theory, a triadic con-ception of meaning must be seen to be first of all peculiar to hu-man language. Should we not consider the possibility that this lin-guistic feature could react on perception and influence it by confi-guring perceptive experience in somewhat analogous ways?
11 A different way of envisaging this kind of distinction can be found in Dewey 1988,Chapter III.
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In my opinion, one problematic point can be seen to emergeeven from a typical phenomenological perspective. Could perce-ption involve such a complex relational structure between a the-matic foreground and a more nuanced background, not to speakabout human activities, practices and forms of life, which are notpresent, without being based on deeply developed capacities ofmemory and imagination – pro-tensions and pre-tensions in thepast and in the future? For sure, bodily habits can be considerednon-linguistic mnemonic and imaginative devices, yet they havenot only a compulsory, repetitive side, but also an innovative di-mension, very often lacking in the case of other animals whose be-havior is more instinctive or mechanical. This creative side in-volves references to virtual situations and contexts that would bedifficult to imagine in relation to a non-linguistic form of life.Moreover, behavioral habits clearly have social roots and typicallyhuman forms of sociality cannot be considered to be independentof language.This aspect raises a further doubt. Could perception be stru-ctured as something expressive, meaningful or provided with sen-se without considering the social dimension or the shared expe-rience of the environment in which human beings find themselvesfrom birth? In other words, could we speak of affective meaningas characterizing the perceptive gesture without taking into ac-count the already communicative environment in which humansare involuntarily immersed from their very first perception asmembers of a social group, at least insofar as they depend on amother or another care-giver? At a certain point in his lessons,Merleau-Ponty draws attention to the «libidinale»  dimension ofthe bodily schema: it should always involve some presentations ofmyself from the point of view of other individuals, which wouldnot be intellectually articulated, but rather based on desire (or re-jection, I would add)12. However, he neither poses the question asto whether such a complex configuration could have emerged in acompletely silent world, nor clearly lets this interpretation influ-ence his conception of perception.More generally, at different stages Merleau-Ponty presentsan image of language as involving a reorganization of human ex-perience, but he never explores the full consequences of this idea:he never asks whether the notion that perception involves a kind
12 See Merleau Ponty 2011, 159.
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of primary meaningfulness per se could still be supported, giventhe current socio-linguistic environment of the human animals,which we cannot deny, if we start from the natural subject we arerather than the disembodied conscience of the phenomenologicaltradition.
5. The idea of the two languagesMerleau-Ponty held the course Recherches sur l’usage littéraire du
langage at the France College together with that on expression.The aim of these investigations is clearly stated at the end of thesecond lesson: to configure a theory of language and of symbolismmore generally. While the course on expression provided a crucialcontribution to the more general effort to develop an articulatedtheory of symbolism, these lessons were mainly intended as animportant step towards a phenomenological conception of lan-guage. Merleau-Ponty’s inquiries into the field of literary languageare a means for him to criticize the typical conception of languageas «langage objectif i.e. fondé sur conventions préalables signe-si-
gnification et possession de celle-ci» (Merleau-Ponty 2013, 87).This idea of language – a common-sense notion also widely en-dorsed in the field of the philosophy of language – should be calledinto question by considering the experience of the writer trying tofind new words to say what was never said before, that is a differ-ent experience of language characterized as langage conquérant,where the relations between signs and things are not already andobviously given, but have to be configured again and again.It has been noted (see Zaccarello 2013, 32) that Merleau-Ponty’s approach to language, with its focus on literary forms, wasmeant to produce a kind of phenomenological epoché of our tradi-tional beliefs on language and a deep reorientation of our usualway of seeing language as basically consisting of fixed connec-tions, both stable in time and closed from the point of view of thereference of a specific sign to its correlative object.The distinction between established language and parole
parlant is not new in Merleau-Ponty’s work and can be tracedback to his Phénoménologie de la perception (see Dreon 2007, 86and ff). However the clarification of the notion of expression sug-gests a further interpretation of this distinction: objective, func-tional, prosaic language is the kind of language which has lost itsexpressive powers and deceives us into thinking that words aremere means to gain direct access to things once and for all, inde-
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pendently of other variables, without any kind of opaqueness orresidue. «Conquering», poetic language is an expressive languagethat is able to create new, unseen connections between words andthings, by not hiding their provisional, open and relational or dia-critic status and the plurality of senses that can only artificially beremoved. Very often this distinction between the two alleged lan-guages seems to take the form of a dichotomy rather than of a dif-ferentiation between two functions of language. However, Mer-leau-Ponty’s ultimate goal is apparently to show that the real op-erating mode of language – including ordinary language – is dia-critic and expressive, and consequently innovative and creative;the summary of the course states that «la justification de la poésie
réhabilite donc le langage tout entier». From this point of view, theidea that common language consists in the mere reproduction offixed connections between signs and their references appears tobe a rather simplified parody of the rich and often opaque charac-ter of  ordinary speech acts.As quite rightly suggested by Jean-Pierre Cometti, who criti-cized this dychotomic view of language, the idea of the two lan-guages may be traced back to Rousseau and Herder, who sharedthe idea of the superiority of poetry over prose and ordinary lan-guage (Cometti 2016, 93). The allegedly authentic expressivenessof poetry is opposed to the apparent transitivity of prosaic lan-guage, which gives us the illusion of gaining direct access to themeaning of the word, not least because if someone does not un-derstand what I mean, I can simply substitute my first sentencewith a second one, and this translation will leave no residue. Tocomplete the comparison, the privilege of poetry is connected toits alleged closeness to our sensible experience. I honestly thinkthat Merleau-Ponty was not seeking to propose a form of dogmat-ic dualism between two kinds of language13. Nonetheless, the en-gagement with literary language in these lessons seems to leadhim to endorse such a dualistic view. To be more precise, whatseems misleading is Merleau-Ponty’s engagement not simply withliterary language in its various forms, but with a particular expe-rience of writing (and painting) in modern western culture – aninquiry into classic epic poetry, for example, would probably haveyielded different results.
13 By contrast, Zaccarello seems to endorse the thesis of a contrast between the two lan-guages in her introductory essay to Merleau-Ponty’s notes.
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In the case of Paul Valéry, his efforts were meant to create anew language for literature, because the French poet regarded thetraditional literary language as exhausted and no longer capableof ensuring any authentic form of expression. In Merleau-Ponty’sreading of Valéry’s texts, his mistrust of a specific literary lan-guage gives rise to the distinction between modern or absolute li-terature and classical literature – compared to the differentiationbetween modern and classical painting. Just as modern paintingemerges when artists loose their belief in the representative ca-pacity of mimesis, absolute literature emerges when writers loosetheir trust in the conventional relations between words and thingsand try to create completely new meaningful connections.The adjective 'absolute' could be understood literally, to in-dicate a sort of creatio ex nihilo, as though the creative act of thewriter producing new senses were freed from any restraint repre-sented by previously established meanings. When Merleau-Pontywrites that «toute l’opération d’un artiste, c'est de faire quelque
chose de rien» (Merleau-Ponty 2013, 89), he seems to be endors-ing this kind of interpretation, which nonetheless represents a pe-culiar kind of aesthetic sensibility, connected to the Romantic con-ception of artistic production as a completely innovative creationand of the artist as a solitary genius.However, even leaving aside Merleau-Ponty’s incautious hi-storical and cultural generalizations, the comparison with the caseof the writer trying to radically renew language is a potentiallymisleading one even for more strictly philosophical reasons. If wepush the implications of this comparison to the limit, it representsthe creation of allegedly completely new relations between signi-fiers and signifieds by a single agent, with no guarantee that hewill be understood by his public. This could be interpreted as acase of private language invention, because the need to under-stand linguistic rules more flexibly than philosophers of languageand linguists usually do seems here to lead to the opposite ex-treme of negating any previously established and shared linguisticrule or of inventing completely new, but inevitably unshared, ru-les. Actually, what we have here are incomplete and informal no-tes, where it is not always easy to understand whether Merleau-Ponty is supporting his own thesis or whether he is reconstructingValéry’s approach to language. Hence, it would be incorrect to re-gard his position on the matter as a firmly held view. Nonetheless,I think that it can be philosophically useful to consider what the
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consequences could be of fully developing some of his sugges-tions.Merleau-Ponty would appear to have been aware of the dan-gers involved in the private language argument if the work of thewriter is literally interpreted as «absolute literature», because heexplicitly raises the issue of the public. Even if there is no publicwho can share the innovative expressive work of the writer, heshould somehow be able to foresee the possible reactions on thepart of his readers14.To sum up, the point here, in my opinion, is that the lecturecourse does not consider the issue of the need for both the innova-tion and sedimentation of meaning in language. To put it differen-tly: while the use of language cannot be reduced to the mere appli-cation of rules already independently configured or intuitedthrough an act of parole, shared language has to do with followingcommon rules and changing them, so as to derive new rules fromold ones.
6. Some alternative suggestionsMy opinion is that, as Merleau-Ponty’s choice not to publish hisbook La prose du monde suggests, his work on language had notreached a final form in the fifties, but rather served as a kind of la-boratory, where he could test his ideas about language by exami-ning them in different contexts. Literary language – particularlyValéry’s or Stendhal’s reflections on the creative work of the writ-er – was not the only field of inquiry explored by Merleau-Ponty,who was also very interested in psychological and linguisticworks focusing on language, and particularly on language-acquisi-tion by infants and on the loss of verbal abilities in pathologicalcases.I would argue that his 1949 course on La conscience et l’ac-
quisition du langage provides some evidence for a partially diffe-rent approach to language dynamics, maybe a more pragmaticand less Romantic one – even though, for the above-mentionedreasons, it would be misleading to emphasize the apparent con-trast between his different paths of inquiry.The approach is first of all different because Merleau-Pontywas considering the case of language-acquisition in human in-
14 See Merleau-Ponty 2013, 115. Indeed Merleau-Ponty also claims that, like commonlanguage, literary language is «pour autrui» (Merleau-Ponty 2013, 114), but this remarkcomes only late in his exposition.
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fants, which prevented him from being fascinated by any kind ofRomantic mythology about the artist – both the modern painter orthe modern writer – fighting to radically change the establishedlanguage and shared conventional meanings by means of subjec-tive acts of expressions.On the contrary, any inquiry into the acquisition of a motherlanguage brings us face to face with what the French philosophercalls «le langage ambiant» surrounding the baby from his veryfirst breath. Merleau-Ponty points out that it is the environmentallanguage that «appelle» the child's thoughts, and leads him to findhis own style both within gestural and linguistic communication(Merleau-Ponty 2001, 46 and 23). While the preeminence ofshared language over individual utterances by the infant is self-evident, this does not mean that no subjective space is left. On thecontrary, the acquisition of an active role in gestural and linguisticconversations appears to be strictly intertwined with the emer-gence of self-identity in comparison to the identity of others –primarily the parents and care-givers of the new apprenticespeaker. This seems to be connected to the capacity to react to thestimuli of one's social (or affective) environment, to say ‘I’ not bymerely copying the words of one's parent15, but by finding one'sown style, in Merleau-Ponty’s words – or,  to put it differently, byfinding one's own way of following shared linguistic and existen-tial rules. Simply put, in this case the direction is from public, sha-red language to the individual, but not private, act of parole. Thiskind of approach is confirmed by Merleau-Ponty when he statesthat «Tout mot isolé suppose un état présent du dialogue. Chaque
phrase est la modulation d'un pouvoir d'expression total que nous a-
vons en commun» (Ibidem, 81).Further useful notes can be found in the last part of thecourse, where Merleau-Ponty discusses the approach to languagein linguistics. As we have seen, the picture of the two languages ischaracterized by a sharp hierarchical order, which causes a com-plete overturning of the traditional view of linguistic utterances asbased on pre-established linguistic norms, by rather considering
la parole parlé as derived from and secondary with respect to le
langage conquérant. By contrast, here the French philosopherspeaks of language as being characterized by two different func-
15 For a similar, yet completely independent, criticism of the recourse to the concept ofimitation in a similar context, see Mead 2011, 12 ff.
65 Lebenswelt, 9 (2016)
tions or needs, which are necessary to one another and whosetension seems to lie at the core of language dynamics.Le langage se caractérise par deux besoins contradictoires: besoind'uniformité et besoin d'expressivité; il faut qu'une forme soit enusage pour être compris, et cependant une forme employée tropfréquemment perd son sens: (formidable, épatant) le besoin d'ex-pressivité lutte contre l'usure de mots et des formes et suscite descréations linguistiques à un moment donné. Ces créations ne ré-pondent bien entendu à aucun plan préétabli. Elles sont systéma-tiques mais elles utilisent la plupart du temps un hasard de l'his-torie de la langue (Ibidem, 76).Common, shared linguistic uses or practices are as constitutive oflanguage as the inventive creation of new meanings, because lan-guage is neither a mere subjective enterprise nor a completelypre-established device, to which speakers simply need to conformtheir utterances.The creation of innovative connections between signs andmeanings very often occurs without any plausible reasons; how-ever the transgression of previous linguistic habits or norms is notarbitrary, because it must take into account all its consequencesfor the complex system of mutual differentiation constituting the
langue at a given moment. Moreover, here Merleau-Ponty privi-leges the image of a re-use, reshuffling, or new attempt to speakabout the way in which innovation and the shattering of previousconnections take place, rather than the image of creatio ex nihilo:pre-established linguistic practices are derived from innovative,risky or even casual uses, but the latter are in turn dependent onpreviously established connections, without which they would beunintelligible. Circularity – not asymmetrical subordinations be-tween the two functions of language – would here appear to bethe model for understanding how human language works16.A final remark should be made on Merleau-Ponty’s emphasison the notion of relativement motivé in relation to the risky lingui-stic move (Ibidem, 85)17. On the one hand, there is the idea of thediachronic system of language being influenced by, but also par-tially stemming from, the hazardously (or casually) introduces no-
16 An interesting point regarding the positive aspects of Saussure’s idea of the diacriticaldynamics of meaning can be found in Roux 2016.17 Kristensen reports that even the course on Le problème de la parole emphasizes thisidea of the «relatively motivated» in meaning changes and notes that this formula in-volves a reference to the issue of tradition and institutions (Kristensen 2010, 133).
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velty. A comparison is drawn with a planetary system, where asingle planet implodes, causing a rearrangement of the wholeequilibrium among the existing forces. On the other hand, Mer-leau-Ponty seems to be aware of the need for new meanings to be«repris et élaboré au moyen d'expression systématique par la com-
munauté des sujets parlant» (Ibidem). There has to be a shared andactive public answer to a new act of parole in order for it to be in-cluded in a language and not be rejected as private jargon.To conclude, let us consider Merleau-Ponty’s final sugges-tions in his lecture course: language is a Gestalt in movement(Merleau-Ponty 2001, 85), whose dynamics cannot be definitivelyfixed; and «cet engrenage du hasard et de l'ordre» (Merleau-Ponty2001, 86) has to do with «la situation commune des hommes»18, ashistory shows.
18 Here Merleau-Ponty is speaking about his own interpretation of Saussure’s idea oflanguage.
